We investigate whether and how the primary market values the innovations of newly public firms at their IPOs by examining the link between the size (the number of patents) and the quality (citation count) of their patent portfolios and IPO valuations. We find that the number of patents, the citation count, and innovation efficiency (patents or citations scaled by research and development expenditure) are positively associated with offer price multiples but the effect of the number of patents subsumes that of the citation count/innovation efficiency. There is no significant effect of patent portfolios on price revisions or first-day returns, suggesting that underwriters/firms price information on innovation quantity and quality in the offer prices and the market makes no further price adjustment on innovation information. The positive effect of innovation quantity on IPO valuation subsumes that of innovation quality. We also demonstrate that the link between patent portfolios and IPO valuations is stronger in the later sample period. Using Tobin's Q as another IPO valuation measure produces similar results. We obtain no evidence that an IPO's patent portfolio is overvalued in the primary market, as the number of patents and the citation count are not significantly associated with long-run stock and operating performances.
Introduction
Recent studies have found that firms reach the apex of their innovative activities at the time of their IPOs (Bernstein, 2015) , and firms often choose to go public following an innovative breakthrough (Pastor, Taylor, and Veronesi, 2009 ). This phenomenon leads us to ask how the primary market values the innovations of newly public firms at their IPOs. While IPO valuations have been examined extensively in the literature, less is known about the link between innovation and IPO valuation. This question is particularly relevant given that the composition of R&D investment has significantly shifted away from federal funding to private funding since 1960 1 and young firms' reliance on public equity issuances to fund R&D investment has increased over the past decades (Brown, Fazzari, and Petersen, 2009 ).
Innovations boost market share, provide competitive advantage, and increase earnings.
Previous studies document that innovations are valued in the secondary market. However, it is not clear how the primary market incorporates IPO firms' innovation capability, measured by the size (the number of patents), quality (citation count), and innovation efficiency of their patent portfolio. The primary market may underestimate valuation information in patents of IPO firms.
Technological information about a patent is hard to decipher for most investors. In addition, evaluating the value of patents requires analyzing the patent, product development and the launch of the product on the market, the profit of which can be highly uncertain and long deferred. Further, the distribution of patent values is highly skewed, with a few patents having a very high value and a large number of patents having low value. Several studies have shown that the market seems to underreact to valuation information regarding seasoned firms' patents. Gu (2005) finds that changes in scaled patent citations are positively associated with firms' future stock returns. Matcolcsy and Wyatt (2008) find that patent count at the industry level is 1 See the Congressional Budget Office's 2005 report entitled "R&D and Productivity Growth". positively associated with contemporaneous market valuations. Cohen, Diether, and Malloy (2013) find that firms with past success in innovation (measured as how firms turn R&D into future sales) outperform other firms that invest the same amount in R&D. Hirshleifer, Hsu, and Li (2012) document a positive relationship between innovative efficiency (patents or citations scaled by R&D expenditures) and future stock returns. If the market fails to fully value innovations for seasoned firms with more predictable and persistent performance, the primary market is likely to undervalue innovation for these newly public IPO firms with less certain future, leading to a positive relation between innovation and future stock returns for IPOs. 2 On the other hand, the primary market may overestimate valuation information in patents of IPO firms, as investors may be overoptimistic about the contribution of patents to the future performance of IPO firms. This view is consistent with the finding that R&D-intensive firms tend to be overpriced as investors overestimate the benefits from R&D or simply ignore the fact that many R&D investments are not profitable (Jensen (1993) ). Similarly, Daniel and Titman (2006) show that growth stock underperformance is concentrated in stocks with significant "intangible" information, consistent with market overreaction to intangible information that is difficult to interpret. Loughran and Ritter (1995) document long-run underperformance of IPO firms, suggesting that investors are overoptimistic about the prospects of firms when they go public. Purnandam and Swaminathan (2004) document that investors are deceived by optimistic growth forecasts and overvalue IPOs with high growth potential. Investors may over extrapolate IPO firms' earnings growth based on their patent portfolios, leading to innovation being overpriced at the IPO and hence to a negative relation between innovation and future stock returns for IPO firms. Therefore, whether the primary market overvalues or undervalues innovations of IPOs is an empirical question.
In this paper, we analyze a sample of 4,795 IPOs during the period 1981-2006 to examine whether and how the primary market values innovations of IPO firms at the time of offering.
First, we investigate the effects of the presence and various measures of patent portfolios on IPO valuation ratios to examine whether underwriters/issuers incorporate pre-IPO patent portfolios to set IPO valuations. We find that firms with patents expect and receive significantly higher valuations than firms without patents when filing for an IPO after controlling for firm and issue characteristics. For IPOs with patents, the number of patents, citation count, and innovation efficiency are positively associated with IPO valuation ratios after extensive controls but that the effect of the number of patents subsumes that of the citation count and innovation efficiency. 3 The size of patent portfolios is the dominant factor in IPO valuations. Splitting the sample into two sub-periods, 1981-1993 and 1993-2006 , we find a positive effect of patent portfolios on valuations in both periods but that the effect is significant only in the second sub-period. This evidence suggests that markets (underwriters) have improved their ability to value patents for IPO firms.
Second, we investigate how various measures of patent portfolios are related to short/long run IPO performances to examine whether the market undervalue or overvalue innovations of IPOs based the market reaction to the valuation effect of patent portfolios for IPOs. We find that these patent-related factors have no effect on initial returns, a measure of valuation adjustment from IPO prices during the first trading day after offerings. We also document that there is no significant association between the number of patents/citation count and abnormal buy-and-hold returns up to three years after IPOs. Finally, we find no relation between post-IPO operating performances and the size and quality of patent portfolios at IPOs.
Overall, these findings suggest that IPOs with larger patent portfolios are not underpriced or overpriced in the primary market, leading to no abnormal long-run stock performance in the secondary equity market.
By examining whether and how the primary market prices patent portfolios of IPOs, our paper adds to the growing literature on innovation and IPO valuation. Specifically, using a more general sample over a longer time period, we measure IPO firms' innovations with a host of patent-related measures and focus on the effect of innovations on IPO valuation multiples at different stages of the IPO process. That leads to two significant new findings. First, pre-IPO innovation seems to be priced correctly in the IPO process as the number of patents and the citation count are not significantly associated with short/long-run stock performances, i.e., there are no incremental returns associated with pre-IPO patent portfolios in the aftermarket. Second, all measures of patent portfolios have positive effects but the size of patent portfolios is the dominant factor in IPO valuations, possibly because technological information about a patent is hard to decipher but the number of patents is a simple and easier concept to grasp.
Early studies often use the input of innovations -R&D expenditure. For example, Guo, Lev, and Shi (2006) focus on the link between R&D expenditure and IPO underpricing and longrun performance. They find R&D is positively related to long-term performance. Several recent studies examine IPO pricing and the innovation output, i.e., the patent. Most use patent counts as a measure of information asymmetry and focus on the relationship between patent counts and short/long run performance. Guo, Lev, and Zhou (2005) Barnanchuk, Kieschnick, and Moussawi (2014) show that incentive compensation, long vesting periods for unexercised options, and tolerance for failure motivate managers to pursue innovation in IPO firms after their offerings.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data sources and sample. Section 3 presents the results. Section 4 concludes.
Sample and Data
This section discusses IPO sample selection, patent metrics as measures of innovations, and the summary statistics comparing IPOs with and without patents at the time of IPOs.
IPO sample selection
We use the Securities Data Corporation Global New Issues Database (hereafter, SDC) to identify all IPOs from January 1, 1981 to December 31, 2006. 4 After correcting mistakes and typographical errors in the SDC database according to Jay Ritter's procedure (http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm), we eliminate financial firms (SIC codes between 6000 and 6999), utilities firms (SIC codes between 4900 and 4999), unit offer, closedend funds (including REIT), ADR, limited partnerships, special acquisition vehicles, and spinoffs. We then require IPOs to have pre-IPO accounting information available from Compustat.
Following this procedure, we identify 4,795 completed IPOs during the period 1981-2006.
Patent measures
We use patent related metrics to measure firms' pre-IPO innovation activities because patents are successful outcomes of past research and development efforts (Hall, Jaffe, and The NBER patent database contains detailed information on all US patents granted by the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO): patent assignee names, firms' Compustat identifiers (GVKEY), and the number of citations received by each patent, application year, grant dates, and 4 Our IPO sample begins in 1981 because the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) patent database starts from 1976, and we examine an IPO's patents from 5 years prior to its offering to the offering date. other details. We use 6-digit Cusip for each IPO from SDC to match historical CUSIP variables in CRSP and Compustat to retrieve CRSP Permno and Compustat GVKEY. We then use GVKEY to match NBER patent data. We also use company names and ticker symbol to verify our matching accuracy.
To prevent any potential look-ahead bias, we follow Hirshleifer, Hsu, and Li (2012) and choose the grant date as the effective date of each patent. We use patents in the five years prior to the IPO to proxy for the firm's pre-IPO innovative capability. The basic measure of innovation output is a simple count of patent grants in the five years before the IPO date to capture the quantity of patents. Following Bernstein (2015) and Bena and Li (2014) , we calculate the scaled patent count, as patent grants vary over time and across technologies. First, for each technology class 5 defined by USPTO and the patent grant year, we compute the average number of granted patents of all firms in its technology class within that grant year. Second, we scale the number of patents granted to the firm in the technology class in that year by the corresponding average value for that technology class and grant year from the first step. Third, for each firm, we sum the scaled number of granted patents from the second step across all technology classes and across 5 years prior to the IPO dates. Lastly, we use scaled number of patents divided by total assets in the fiscal year immediately before the IPO to control for the size effect.
We also use citation count -the number of citations a patent receives after its approvalas another measure of innovation output because the importance of patents varies. We calculate citations for patents granted over the five years prior to IPO dates. The citation count is the number of citations a patent receives upon its approval to the IPO year. We adjust for time and 5 Technology classes are defined by the USPTO to capture the technological essence of an invention. Technological classes are often more detailed than industry classifications , with about 400 main (3-digit) patent classes and over 120,000 patent subclasses. technology variation by scaling each patent citation count by the average number of citations received by all patents granted in the same year and technology class. For firm i, we calculate , the number of citations received in year j (j=max (-5, grant year-IPO year) to j=0, year 0 is the IPO year) by patent k, scaled by the average number of citations received in year j by all patents of the same technology class granted in the same year. Second, we sum scaled citations for IPO firm i's patents granted over the five years before its IPO date as following:
The final measure, innovation efficiency (IE), compares patent count or citation to R&D expenses (Hirshleifer, Hsu, and Li, 2012 We also provide additional details about each variable's calculation in the Appendix.
Sample characteristics
IPOs with patents are firms with at least one patent granted in the five years before their IPO dates; IPOs without patents are firms with no patent granted during the same period. 
Empirical Results

IPO valuations: with patents vs. without patents
We first examine the difference in IPO valuations of IPOs with and without patents to answer the question whether having a patent is valued in the primary market. We investigate four aspects of IPO valuations: Expected valuation ratio, the mid-point of the preliminary offer price range divided by sales per share for the fiscal year prior to the IPO date; Offer valuation ratio, 
IPO valuations of IPOs with patents
Given that IPOs with patents receive higher valuation than IPOs without patents, we focus on IPOs with patents to examine how the size and the quality of their patent portfolio at the time of offering are related to IPO valuations in this section. Specifically, we investigate how the number of patents, the citation count, and innovation efficiency described in section 2.2 are correlated with valuation ratios (Table 3 ) and initial returns (Table 4 ). The coefficients of other control variables are consistent with section 3.1 and previous studies; we focus on the coefficients of the number of patents, the citation count, and innovation efficiency in this section.
Final IPO valuations (offer prices)
Panel A of Table 3 Panels B and C of Table 3 report the results of regressions on IPO valuations for two subperiods. Similarly, it shows that the link between the size, quality of patent portfolios, and innovation efficiency and IPO valuations has strengthened over time. 11 Table 4 reports the results of initial returns regressions (Eq. 2 with the Patent dummy replaced by various patent metrics), which estimate the effects of size, quality of the IPO's patent portfolios, and innovation efficiency on the valuation change for IPOs from the primary market to the secondary market. None of the coefficients of the size and quality of IPO's patent portfolios or innovation efficiency is significant, suggesting that underpricing is not related to the size, quality of the IPO's patent portfolios, or innovation efficiency.
Initial returns
Overall, the results on valuation ratios, price revisions, and initial returns suggest that: 1) information on having patents and the size of IPO patent portfolios are priced into IPO valuations from the beginning of the offering process, 2) information on having patents and the size of patent portfolios are uncorrelated with IPO underpricing.
The market value of newly public firms: Tobin's Q
We use Tobin's Q as a proxy of a firm's valuation premium in this section to investigate the effects of the number of patents, the citation count, and innovation efficiency on IPO valuations. 12 We use this proxy for several reasons. First, the extant literature on the patent valuation of seasoned public firms often uses Tobin's Q as a proxy of a firm's valuation premium. Second, using valuation ratios based on expected offer prices and offer prices, we
show that having patents and/or larger patent portfolios has a significantly positive effect on IPO valuations in the primary market. Our results from valuation multiples in the primary market lead to the question of whether the positive effects that connect patent-related factors on Tobin's Q from secondary market valuation are present from the very beginning of IPO firms' public listing. To answer the question, we estimate models similar to those in Table 3 on Tobin's Q for each IPO in our sample at the first day of secondary market trading (TobinsQ_day1) and at the IPO's one-year anniversary (TobinsQ_year1). In addition, using final offer price, we also calculate Tobin's Q for each IPO at day 0 -the offer price (TobinsQ_day0) -as a second measure of an IPO's valuation in the primary market.
TobinQ_day0 is defined as the sum of the firm's market value of equity (offer price times the number of outstanding shares) and the book value of its total liabilities divided by the sum of the book value of its total assets and IPO proceeds. TobinQ_day1 is defined similarly except that we use the first trading day closing price to calculate the market value of equity. Book value of total assets and liabilities are for the fiscal year prior to IPO date. We follow Kim and Ritter (1999) and Hendricks and Miller (2014) by adding the amount of proceeds received from the IPO to the firm's most recently reported book value of assets prior to the offering. Hendricks and Miller (2014) suggest that this calculation creates a more accurate representation of the assets being valued by investors at the beginning of the secondary market trading. TobinQ_year1 is defined as the sum of the firm's market value of equity (fiscal year end closing price times the number of outstanding shares) and the book value of its total liabilities divided by the book value of its total assets. The fiscal year end closing price and book value of total assets and liabilities are for the one fiscal year after IPO date. Table 5 provides the results of Tobin's Q regressions. Panel A is for the Tobin's Q for each IPO at day 0. We find that using Tobin's Q derived from offer prices, the effect of the number of patents, the citation count, and innovation efficiency on IPO valuation is always positive. For example, the coefficients of Ln (Scaled Patent/Assets+1) are significantly positive.
This result suggests that the positive effect that connects the size of patent portfolios to Tobin's Q is present from the beginning of offerings for newly public IPOs. We also find that the positive effect of the size of patent portfolios on firms' Tobin's Q is present from the first day of trading in the secondary market -the results of Panel B for Tobin's Q of each IPO at day 1 are consistent with those in Table 3 , and the coefficients of Ln (Scaled Patent/Assets+1) are always significantly positive. Panel C for Tobin's Q of each IPO at the IPO's one-year anniversary shows results similar to those in Panel B.
Innovation and long-run performance
Long-run stock performance
IPOs with patents and/or with larger patent portfolios could receive higher IPO valuations but still be mispriced in the primary market. The primary market could overvalue innovation at
IPOs if the market is too optimistic about the growth potential embedded in innovation. On the other hand, the IPO valuations for innovation may be inadequate if investors are unable to assess the prospects of innovation fully. In either case, the mis-valuation related to IPO patent portfolios should be reflected in long-run stock performance. In this section, we examine long-run stock performance to investigate whether the market values innovation appropriately at the IPOs.
To evaluate long-run stock performance, we calculate buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) as following:
where rat is the monthly return of IPO firm i in calendar month t (t=0 for IPO month), and mrit is the monthly return for the matched portfolio in calendar month t. T is the 12/24/36 th months after IPO issuance or delisting, whichever comes first. That is, if IPO firms are delisted from CRSP before 12/24/36 months after issuance, we will calculate the IPO and its matched portfolio buyand-hold returns only up to the delisting month. For each IPO firm, we identify a size and bookto-market matched portfolio. We obtain 25 portfolios formed on size and book-to-market from Professor Kenneth R. French's website. 13 French creates quintile breakpoints based on market value of equity (size) and ratios of book value of equity to market value of equity (book-tomarket) using only stocks trading on the NYSE. The market value of equity for each year t is calculated at the end of June of year t. The book-to-market ratio for the June of year t is the book value of equity for the last fiscal year end in t-1 divided by market value of equity for December of t-1. The annual size breakpoints are then intersected with the book-to-market breakpoints to create 25 size and book-to-market portfolios using all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks for which they have data for market value of equity and (positive) book value of equity. We use an equally weighted return of all firms in a given portfolio. We then classify IPOs into these quintiles based on their market value of equity (offer price times number of outstanding shares) and book-to-market ratio (book value of equity for the fiscal year prior to IPOs divided by the market value of equity based on offer price). The corresponding portfolio is the IPO firm's size and book-to-market matched portfolio.
Panel A of Table 6 presents the regression results of the relation between the size and the quality of patent portfolios and BHAR -buy-and-hold cumulative abnormal returns -from one to three years after the IPO offerings for IPOs with patents. The results are largely consistent with prior studies. For example, one to three year abnormal buy-and-hold returns are positively related to the investment banker reputation (Carter, Dark, and Sapp, 2010) . IPOs offered in the dot-com bubble period generally have lower abnormal long-term stock returns, suggesting that
IPOs offered in the "hot" market tend to underperform (Derrien, 2005) . Most importantly, the size and quality of IPOs' patent portfolios are not significantly related to long-run stock returns.
We find no evidence that IPOs' patent portfolios are associated with abnormal post-IPO long-run stock returns, suggesting that IPOs with larger patent portfolios are not overvalued in the primary market, leading to no abnormal long-run stock performance in the secondary equity market than IPOs with smaller patent portfolios.
Long-run operating performance
We further investigate the effect of IPOs' patent portfolios on post-IPO abnormal operating performance up to three years after IPOs. Overall, results on long-run stock and operating performances suggest that the amount of the offer valuation premium of IPOs with larger patent portfolios is appropriate. For IPOs with patents, this premium is likely a response to the perceived lower risk due to larger patent portfolios with diversified patents and is not related to higher post-IPO performance expectations.
Conclusions
In this paper, we investigate an important yet understudied aspect of IPOs, namely, the IPO valuations associated with innovation. Using patent metrics as measures of innovation capabilities, we investigate whether and how the primary market values the innovations of newly public firms at their IPOs by examining the link between the size, quality, and innovation efficiency of their patent portfolios and IPO valuations. We find that the number of patents, the citation count, and innovation efficiency are positively associated with offer price multiples but the effect of the number of patents subsumes that of the citation count and innovation efficiency.
The size, the quality, and innovation efficiency of an IPO's patent portfolio have no significant effect on price revisions or IPO first-day returns, suggesting markets do not significantly undervalue the patent portfolio in the initial offer price. We obtain no evidence that an IPO's patent portfolio is overvalued in the primary market, as the number of patents and the citation count are not significantly associated with long-run stock returns or long-run operating performance. The expected valuation ratios (offer valuation ratio) are defined as expected offer price (offer price) divided by sales per share from the fiscal year preceding the IPO date. The expected offer price is the midpoint of the initial price range. Price revision is the offer price divided by the midpoint of the initial filing price range minus one. Initial return is the closing price on the first trading day divided by the offer price minus one. Robust t -statistics are reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates. We control for industry (based on the 2-digit primary SIC code) and year (based on IPO date) fixed effects. The superscripts ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively, in two-tailed tests. All variables are defined in the Appendix. The dependent variables are the offer valuation ratio, defined as offer price divided by sales per share from the fiscal year preceding the IPO date. Robust tstatistics are reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates. To save the space, coefficients for other independent variables for Panels B and C are not reported and available upon request. We control for industry (based on the 2-digit primary SIC code) and year (based on IPO date) fixed effects. The superscripts ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively, in two-tailed tests. All variables are defined in the Appendix. 
Table 4 Initial returns of IPOs with patents
This table shows estimates of OLS regressions of initial returns. The dependent variables are initial return s, defined as the closing price on the first trading day divided by the offer price, minus one. Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates. We control for industry (based on 2-digit primary SIC code) and year (based on IPO date) fixed effects. The superscripts ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively, in two-tailed tests. All variables are defined in the Appendix.
Dependent variables: Initial returns Explanatory variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ln ( This table shows estimates of OLS regressions of Tobin's Q. The dependent variables in Panel A/B/C are the natural logarithm of Tobin's Q measured at offer price (TobinQ_day0)/first trading day closing price (TobinQ_day1)/one year after IPO (TobinQ_year1). TobinQ_day0 is defined as the sum of the firm's market value of equity (offer price times the number of outstanding shares) and the book value of its total liabilities divided by the sum of book value of its total assets and IPO proceeds. TobinQ_day1 is d efined similarly except that we use the first trading day closing price to calculate the market value of equity. IPO proceeds are the number of shares sold in the offering multiplied by the offer price. Book value of total assets and liabilities are for the fiscal year prior to IPO date. We add the IPO proceeds to the most recent book value of assets prior to the IPO. TobinQ_year1 is defined as the sum of the firm's market value of equity (fiscal year end closing price times the number of outstanding shares ) and the book value of its total liabilities divided by the book value of its total assets. The fiscal year end closing price and book value of total assets and liabilities are for the one fiscal year after the IPO date. In Panels A and B, the covariates of IPO financials are measured for the fiscal year prior to the IPO. In Panel C, the covariates of IPO firm financials are measured for the IPO year. Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates. To save the space, coefficients for other independent variables (Ln (Proceeds), Prior industry-adjusted OPA, Leverage, R&D, Capital Intensity, VC, Ln (Age), Top IB, Bubble, and Tech) are not reported and available upon request. We control for industry (based on the 2-digit primary SIC code) and year (based on the IPO date) fixed effects. The superscripts ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively, in twotailed tests. All variables are defined in the Appendix. (T= 12, 24, and 36) . The dependent variables for column (B) are industry-adjusted operating income before depreciation on assets (OPA) from one to three years after IPO. The industry adjusted OPA is defined as the difference between an IPO's OPA and the median value of the same two-digit SIC industry's OPA. The OPA is defined as the operating income before depreciation (OIBD) divided by total assets. Year 0 represents the IPO year. Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates. The superscripts ***, **, * denote statistical significan ce at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively, in two-tailed tests. All variables are defined in the Appendix. The scaled number of patents granted in the five years before the IPO date. First, for each technology class defined by USPTO and patent grant year, we compute the average number of granted patents of all firms. Second, we scale the number of granted patents to the firm in a technology class in that year by the corresponding average value from the first step. Third, for each firm, we sum the scaled number from the second step across all technology classes and five years.
Scaled Citation
The citation count is the number of citations a patent receives upon its approval to the IPO year. We adjust for time and technology variation by scaling each patent citation count by the average of citations received by all patents granted in the same yea r and technology class defined by USPTO. For firm i, we compute C ik j , the number of citations received in year j (j=max(-5, grant year-IPO year) to j=0, year 0 is the IPO year) by patent k, scaled by the average number of citations received in year j by all patents of the same technology class granted in the same year. Second, we sum scaled citations for IPO firm i's patents granted over the previous five years before the IPO date as follows: The difference between an IPO's OPA and the median value of the same two -digit SIC industry's OPAs for the fiscal year prior to the IPO date. The OPA is defined as the operating income before depreciation (OIBD) divided by total assets. Leverage
The sum of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities divided by total assets.
R&D
The ratio of R&D expenses divided by total assets in the fiscal year prior to the IPO date.
Growth
The sales growth rate from the year prior to the IPO to the IPO year.
Assets
Total assets in the fiscal year prior to the IPO date in millions.
Panel C: Issue characteristics
Patent A dummy variable that equals one if firms have at least one patent granted in the five years before their IPO dates and zero otherwise.
PSind Industry median of P/S (market value of equity divided by total sales) based on the twodigit primary SIC code during the issuer's IPO year.
Proceeds
The number of shares sold in the offering multiplied by the offer price. The average initial returns of IPOs within the same two-digit primary SIC code industry of the sample IPO between a firm's IPO filing date and its IPO date.
Expected valuation ratio
The expected offer price divided by sales per share from the fiscal year preceding the IPO date. The expected offer price is the midpoint of the initial price range.
Offer valuation ratio The offer price divided by sales per share from the fiscal year preceding the IPO date.
TobinQ_day0
The sum of the firm's market value of equity (offer price times the number of outstanding shares) and the book value of its total liabilities divided by the sum of the book value of its total assets and IPO proceeds. The book values of total assets and liabilities are for the fiscal year prior to the IPO date.
TobinQ_day1
The sum of the firm's market value of equity (first trading day closing price times the number of outstanding shares) and the book value of its total liabilities divided by the sum of book value of its total assets and IPO proceeds. Book values of total assets and liabilities are for the fiscal year prior to IPO date.
TobinQ_year1
The sum of the firm's market value of equity (fiscal year end closing price times the number of outstanding shares) and the book value of its total liabilities divided by the book value of its total assets. The fiscal year end closing price and book value o f total assets and liabilities are for the one fiscal year after the IPO date.
Price revisions
The offer price divided by the mid-point of filing price range minus one.
Initial returns
The first trading day closing price divided by the offer price minus one.
